The Syria Balancing Act: Supporting Transition, Avoiding Blowback
In one of the most detailed examinations of the operational capacity of jihadist elements in Syria, Bilal Saab identified a handful of small jihadist groups, saying that the Syrian battlefield is “awash with al-Qa`ida-linked jihadist cells.”[4] These cells, Saab argued, are disorganized and lack a charismatic leader capable of unifying them.[5] Other media reports describe radical fringe elements operating within a diverse setup that is still dominated by Syrian nationalists rather than transnational ideologues. In arguably the most comprehensive study so far, an International Crisis Group report in October outlined how “the presence of a powerful Salafi strand among Syria’s rebels has become irrefutable.”[6]Increasingly Unsecured Borders For the past 40 years, Syria has used its foreign policy to back proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. Yet prior to the outbreak of protests in March 2011, Syria was already experiencing a low level terrorist threat from the Salafi-jihadi group Jund al-Sham, which claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country including one on the U.S. Embassy in Damascus in 2006.[12] It is also suspected of targeting a Syrian intelligence building in Damascus in September 2008, which killed approximately 17 people.[13
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