Tuesday, April 9, 2013

WESTERN SUBVERSION .REGIME CHANGE THRU RETHORIC,CRITICISM,AND SHADY FUNDING...  Democracy in Retreat? Prescriptions for the future
The failure of young democracies in so many regions of the world has had enormous consequences, writes Joshua Kurlantzick. Most obviously, the renewed strength of authoritarian rule means that billions of people continue to live under repressive or pseudo-democratic hybrid regimes, deprived of the freedoms most in the West take for granted. But external actors can regain the initiative, he argues in this extract from his new book*, by adopting new approaches to democracy assistance.
Outside actors can have the greatest impact on democratization at three critical points in the process. First, when countries are still under authoritarian rule, outside actors can play a significant role through rhetorical criticism, funding of prodemocracy dissident groups(ED NOTE:SUBVERSIVES) inside the country, or just publicly providing a different model of governance to authoritarianism, one that average citizens of an autocratic state can see. This role was played in the 1980s when the United States and Western Europe increased their rhetorical condemnation of Soviet bloc rulers, boosted their support for broadcasts into the Eastern bloc, provided exchange programs for intellectuals, and helped promote labor rights and other civil society.Once a developing nation has begun to make a transition to democracy, outside actors have their second chance to make a significant impact. In the early years of the transition, when countries normally are more aid-dependent, political culture and institutions are still in flux, and the possibility of a regression to authoritarianism remains, major donors can play a dual role: they can continue using aid money and rhetoric to demand that the countries do not regress to authoritarian rule, while simultaneously offering critical expertise in areas like developing civil society, fighting corruption, and holding and monitoring elections. With democracies so nascent, this expertise is more likely to be needed and absorbed than later on when countries like Tunisia would develop their own cadres of experts, and when politicians, labor leaders, and journalists might be more resistant to training programs from foreign nations. 
Meanwhile, leading democracies can be using aid money and bully pulpits to try to ensure that elements from the previous authoritarian regimes do not return to power: Washington can warn the military in places like Thailand not to launch coups, link aid to benchmarks of democratization, and work with developing nations to create reasonable systems of accountability for former authoritarian leaders.  Of course, the United States, which is widely unpopular today in countries such as Egypt, needs to be cautious—if its pressure on developing nations to stick to a democratic transition becomes counterproductive, then it may be better to stay quiet, at least for a time.
Finally, as developing countries’ democracies become more stable and mature, donors can play a third role. By this point, as in Indonesia, the Philippines, or South Africa today, the process of democratization is unlikely to be reversed, and is less dependent on aid as a percentage of its national budget. At this point developed democracies can help solidify these nations’ democracies by recognizing progress and including them in international institutions like the G-20 and other groups, citing them as examples of democratic change, and working alongside local democracy promotion specialists from these countries on the ground, as equal partners by, for example, calling on democracies like Indonesia or South Africa to send experts—in elections, budgeting, media, or other topics—to developing countries at an earlier stage of democratic development.
Focus Spending on Best Prospects
Democracy assistance should focus more clearly on countries where efforts can make the largest impact with limited dollars. This is not an easy trade-off, and any decision to ignore potential democratic change somewhere will be open to criticism. But it is a necessary selectiveness in an era of diminished resources and significant existing global threats including terrorism and nuclear proliferation, both of which much be addressed as well, at significant cost.  [[[[The United States should be]]]] [[[[[[ consistent in rhetorically]]]]]] upholding democracy and human rights, but focus democracy assistance on a certain spectrum of countries where democratic consolidation seems most feasible, assistance can make a greater difference, and aid can be packaged with multilateral assistance from other donors.]]]]]  Leading democracies can identify the nations ripest for democracy promotion assistance by examining them on a range of indicators, such as those used by Freedom House or the Economist Intelligence Unit, to rank countries that have begun transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.
[ed note:click link for whole piece...

No comments:

Post a Comment