[ED NOTES:THIS IS NOTHING MORE THEN A SET-UP OUTLINED ON SEPT. 6TH BY THE NEOCOLONIAL-ANGLO AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENTS COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,VIA EX US AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA WHO TOOK PART IN 2002 COUP THERE! BUT BEFORE WE GET INTO THAT,LETS EXPOSE PILLAY ARGUMENTS..THE IACHR IS NOTHING MROE THEN A FRONT FOR OAS WICH ENDORSES US's AND ITS ALLIES, BACKED COUPS IN LATIN AMERICA!!SEE, THE IACHR IS NOTHING MORE THEN AN ORGAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES A.K.A KNOWN AS ''OAS'' , BOTH HAVE ZERO CREDIBILITY...SEE...IACHR Rehashes Debunked Claims about Venezuela http://www.zcommunications.org/iachr-rehashes-debunked-claims-about-venezuela-by-joe-emersberger Ambassador Álvarez: Senators Ignore Political Bias of IACHR Reporthttp://www.embavenez-us.org/news.php?nid=5280 Interamerican Court of Human Rights caught conspiring against justice and Venezuela http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_58983.shtml Honduras Under Coup Leaders gains re-entry into ''OAS'' http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/06/annie-bird-honduras-back-in-oas.html OAS Rapporteur complicity on Globovision case http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/10/venezuela-condemns-oas-rapporteur.html (THESE ARE JUST A FEW EXAMPLES,ONE CAN POST HUNDREDS MORE)
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SEPT 6TH...C.F.R. POSTS SUBVERSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESTABILIZING VENEZUELA,CREATING CHAOS AND REMOVING CHAVEZ BEFORE OR EVEN AFTER ELECTIONS,BY EX US AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA(LENGTHY PIECE SO I'LL HIGHLIGTH IMPORTANT PARTS ONLY CRITIQUES WILL FOLLOW)
Political Unrest in Venezuela by Patrick D. Duddy(EX US AMB. TO VENEZUELA) Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 16
Over the course of the past year, Chavez and several of his most senior associates have asserted that there will be instability and violence if he is not reelected. Private businessmen are accused of hoarding and their businesses are expropriated. Stocks of staples are perpetually low at present in Venezuela because of Chavista penalties for hoarding in reaction to price controls.Remaining independent media are closed and/or prominent journalists are detained. The independent media have been under pressure by Chavez since 2006. Most that remain are critical of the government.Sharp divisions within Chavismo surface publicly, suggesting insiders know Chavez is failing. There are persistent rumors of tensions among prominent senior Chavistas, several of whom have been perceived as jockeying to position themselves as Chavez's logical successor.A senior political figure close to either Chavez or Capriles is assassinated. Though the homicide rate in Venezuela is high, political assassination is rare.Local supplies of gasoline are interrupted. Most Venezuelans, especially poorer Venezuelans, consider cheap (pennies per gallon) gasoline a birthright. Efforts to raise prices in 1989 caused violent riots in the capital. The government via PDVSA controls the supply of gasoline, and an interruption of supply would likely enrage segments of the population. Implications for U.S. Interests Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region.
Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day.Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region.The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Preventive Options Two factors seem most likely to dissuade leading Venezuelan actors from violence: scrutiny of the electoral process and a clear sense that the rest of the Western Hemisphere would not countenance an attempt to subvert or set aside the outcome of a legitimate vote. All Western Hemisphere international organizations make having a fully functioning democracy a necessary precondition to full participation. Chavez's influence (beyond oil revenue) has always rested in large part on the perception that he is legitimately elected and enjoys a popular mandate. The options to prevent instability in Venezuela include the following:Regional/Bilateral: The United States could urge Brazil, Colombia, and other countries in the region to press for transparency and compliance with the highest possible standard of election administration and to press Venezuela to permit exit polling, quick counts, and other mechanisms for independent validation of the electoral results. Brazil, in particular, has influence with the Chavez government and seeks to play more of a leadership role globally and in the hemisphere. Instability, violence, or an interruption of democracy in Venezuela would hurt Brazil's geopolitical ambitions as well as its extensive business interests. It would also be problematic for the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which recently made Venezuela a full member. (Mercosur requires members to be fully functioning democracies and recently suspended Paraguay after the Senate there removed the sitting president under circumstances that other members considered questionable.)Extra-regional: The EU (and especially Spain), Japan, and China all have significant investments in Venezuela that would be at risk in the event of an internal conflict. Interested stakeholder countries could be encouraged to make clear that free and fair elections in Venezuela, and an orderly transition if Chavez loses, are important to the global community. (China, however, while having a growing stake in the Venezuelan economy, is unlikely to agree to pressure Caracas.) Electoral authorities in democratic capitals could be encouraged to review with the media the criteria for judging the quality of election administration.Multilateral: The Venezuelan government declined to invite substantial international observation and the deployment of a robust international mission is most likely impractical now except for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Nevertheless, the United States and other hemispheric partners could press the OAS to insist that the Venezuelan government permit the accreditation of interested diplomats and other volunteers as election observers and to permit international media–facilitated access to voting sites. In the event a new election was necessary for any reason, the OAS could push for early deployment of an international observer mission. (International observation and other steps to guarantee transparency were precisely the elements Chavez considered necessary for a free and fair election when he first ran for the presidency in 1998.)Mitigating Options In the event that the government either orchestrates or takes advantage of a violent popular reaction to Chavez's defeat, death, or incapacitation to suspend civil liberties and govern under a renewable state of exception, the United States could take or encourage several steps in order to accelerate a return to democracy. The likelihood of success for unilateral U.S. efforts is low; multilateral efforts that include other important regional players are far more likely to influence Venezuelan behavior.
Diplomatic Options Together with like-minded nations, the United States could demand that the OAS declare Venezuela in breach of its obligations as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and encourage a secretary-general–led mission to Caracas. (Note: It would be difficult to generate a consensus condemnation of Venezuela at the OAS but the secretary-general can undertake such a mission on his own authority. A secretary-general–led mission would still require Venezuelan acquiescence to enter the country.) Venezuela would understand that if regional and subregional organizations determine that the country is no longer a functioning democracy, it will be suspended, as has happened recently with both Honduras and Paraguay.The United States could bring the issue of Venezuelan democracy to the United Nations Security Council and urge the UN to endorse a fact-finding mission or to explicitly endorse regional efforts to restore democracy.With other international partners, including the European Union, the United States could support offers to mediate.If it proves difficult to get the OAS or UN involved in mitigation efforts, the United States could propose a delegation of foreign ministers to travel to Caracas to engage the Venezuelan authorities.
The United States could suspend visas for all individuals (officials and nonofficials, government and opposition) perceived to be involved in precipitating violence or undermining democracy; or suspend normal visa adjudication services at the U.S. embassy pending a resolution of the crisis.
Economic and Financial Options In the event of violence or an interruption of democracy, the United States could freeze individual bank accounts of key figures involved or responsible and seize assets in the United States. It could also arrange for the proceeds of Venezuelan government–owned corporate entities like CITGO to be held in escrow accounts until democracy is restored and encourage other important trading partners (i.e., Canada, Spain, France, Brazil) to do the same.
If other forms of pressure fail to have an effect, the United States could block access to CITGO's refining facilities in the United States and consider prohibiting PDVSA oil sales to the United States while the government's status is uncertain.
Military Options The United States could encourage other Latin American militaries, as well perhaps as the Spanish, to communicate to the Venezuelan military the importance of complying with constitutional mandates, respecting human rights, and preserving democracy. While Chavez loyalists dominate the Venezuelan high command, it is not clear to what extent they control the middle ranks. Nor is it clear to what extent the military's loyalty to Chavez's Bolivarian movement would trump other considerations. In the abortive coup of 2002 the military temporarily removed Chavez but also restored him to power.
Direct military involvement appears inappropriate. The United States has never unilaterally intervened militarily in a South American internal conflict (criticisms of Plan Colombia notwithstanding) and to do so now would likely unite most of South America behind Chavez and/or his successor. Most Latin American countries are profoundly reluctant to intervene or even comment on the internal affairs of their hemispheric neighbors. Even multilateral military intervention in any but the direst circumstances (Haiti) is all but unthinkable.
Recommendations
As the election approaches, the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela. The United States should restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States should emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuela's political problems, it should also encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemisphere's concern that democracy be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and violence be avoided. The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and verification of results should be stressed. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian Revolution. More specifically, the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible:
Reach out to important regional and extra-regional partners now to gauge their likely response to instability, particularly those countries that would be most directly affected (i.e., Brazil, Colombia, and the EU), and convey a sense of the range of options the U.S. government would entertain in the event of an outbreak of violence and/or interruption of democracy. It will be particularly important to engage Brazil and its Mercosur partners early because of their close relations with Chavez to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings arising between them and the United States. This should include proactively sharing information that would signal Venezuelan preparations for violence or manipulation of the electoral outcome.
Begin identifying important actors (military and civilian officials as well as opposition figures) now whose visas would be canceled and accounts frozen in the event that they are linked to political violence and/or an interruption of democracy.
Work to build awareness at the UN, in Europe, and in Japan of what is happening in Venezuela and attempt to organize a coalition of partners to limit an illegitimate Venezuelan administration's access to government assets held abroad as well as to the international financial system.
Continue to stress directly to the Venezuelan government as well as publicly that the United States will accept and be prepared to work with a legitimately elected government, including one headed by Hugo Chavez or a Chavista successor, provided the election is free, fair, and constitutional.
Leverage defense department contacts in Latin American and Spanish armed forces to communicate to the Venezuelan military leadership that they are obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country's democratic tradition.
Diplomatic Options Together with like-minded nations, the United States could demand that the OAS declare Venezuela in breach of its obligations as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and encourage a secretary-general–led mission to Caracas. (Note: It would be difficult to generate a consensus condemnation of Venezuela at the OAS but the secretary-general can undertake such a mission on his own authority. A secretary-general–led mission would still require Venezuelan acquiescence to enter the country.) Venezuela would understand that if regional and subregional organizations determine that the country is no longer a functioning democracy, it will be suspended, as has happened recently with both Honduras and Paraguay.The United States could bring the issue of Venezuelan democracy to the United Nations Security Council and urge the UN to endorse a fact-finding mission or to explicitly endorse regional efforts to restore democracy.With other international partners, including the European Union, the United States could support offers to mediate.If it proves difficult to get the OAS or UN involved in mitigation efforts, the United States could propose a delegation of foreign ministers to travel to Caracas to engage the Venezuelan authorities.
The United States could suspend visas for all individuals (officials and nonofficials, government and opposition) perceived to be involved in precipitating violence or undermining democracy; or suspend normal visa adjudication services at the U.S. embassy pending a resolution of the crisis.
Economic and Financial Options In the event of violence or an interruption of democracy, the United States could freeze individual bank accounts of key figures involved or responsible and seize assets in the United States. It could also arrange for the proceeds of Venezuelan government–owned corporate entities like CITGO to be held in escrow accounts until democracy is restored and encourage other important trading partners (i.e., Canada, Spain, France, Brazil) to do the same.
If other forms of pressure fail to have an effect, the United States could block access to CITGO's refining facilities in the United States and consider prohibiting PDVSA oil sales to the United States while the government's status is uncertain.
Military Options The United States could encourage other Latin American militaries, as well perhaps as the Spanish, to communicate to the Venezuelan military the importance of complying with constitutional mandates, respecting human rights, and preserving democracy. While Chavez loyalists dominate the Venezuelan high command, it is not clear to what extent they control the middle ranks. Nor is it clear to what extent the military's loyalty to Chavez's Bolivarian movement would trump other considerations. In the abortive coup of 2002 the military temporarily removed Chavez but also restored him to power.
Direct military involvement appears inappropriate. The United States has never unilaterally intervened militarily in a South American internal conflict (criticisms of Plan Colombia notwithstanding) and to do so now would likely unite most of South America behind Chavez and/or his successor. Most Latin American countries are profoundly reluctant to intervene or even comment on the internal affairs of their hemispheric neighbors. Even multilateral military intervention in any but the direst circumstances (Haiti) is all but unthinkable.
Recommendations
As the election approaches, the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela. The United States should restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States should emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuela's political problems, it should also encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemisphere's concern that democracy be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and violence be avoided. The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and verification of results should be stressed. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian Revolution. More specifically, the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible:
Reach out to important regional and extra-regional partners now to gauge their likely response to instability, particularly those countries that would be most directly affected (i.e., Brazil, Colombia, and the EU), and convey a sense of the range of options the U.S. government would entertain in the event of an outbreak of violence and/or interruption of democracy. It will be particularly important to engage Brazil and its Mercosur partners early because of their close relations with Chavez to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings arising between them and the United States. This should include proactively sharing information that would signal Venezuelan preparations for violence or manipulation of the electoral outcome.
Begin identifying important actors (military and civilian officials as well as opposition figures) now whose visas would be canceled and accounts frozen in the event that they are linked to political violence and/or an interruption of democracy.
Work to build awareness at the UN, in Europe, and in Japan of what is happening in Venezuela and attempt to organize a coalition of partners to limit an illegitimate Venezuelan administration's access to government assets held abroad as well as to the international financial system.
Continue to stress directly to the Venezuelan government as well as publicly that the United States will accept and be prepared to work with a legitimately elected government, including one headed by Hugo Chavez or a Chavista successor, provided the election is free, fair, and constitutional.
Leverage defense department contacts in Latin American and Spanish armed forces to communicate to the Venezuelan military leadership that they are obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country's democratic tradition.
[ED NOTES:ALL ABOVE ARE JUSTA FEW EXCERPTS ONLY.(SEE WHOLE REPORT)WHEN ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT,THE U.S. WAS BEHIND COUP IN HONDURAS, Key leaders of Honduras military coup trained in U.S. | The Institute ... Tiwy.com - July 24, 2009 - Honduras Coup: the US Connection Washington behind the Honduras coup: Here is the evidence ... Honduran Coup: The U.S. Connection | FPIF The role of USAID in the New Selloff of Honduras http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/05/role-of-usaid-in-new-selloff-of.html MUST READ - HONDURAS- U.S.AID GRANTS COUP PARTICIPANTS http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/10/must-read-honduras-u.html
PARAGUAY, Paraguay: US intelligence behind the return of Stroessner's mafia Tiwy.com - June 26, 2012 - The Paraguay Coup: Carefully ... Paraguay 'coup': Outside job? — RT ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF HAITI Why U.N./U.S. occupation of Haiti must end Punishing the Population: The American Occupations of Haiti and ... U.S. occupation Haiti | Black Agenda Report , THE ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF LAST ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA,SEE... OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBER AND NICARAGUAN EX MILITARY COMMANDER EXPOSES US PLOT TO RIG ELLECTIONS,SAYS HE WAS OFFERED MONEY TO PUSH US PROPAGANDA AGAINST ORTEGAS RE ELECTION VICTORY http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/11/opposition-party-member-and-nicaraguan.html http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/11/nicaraguan-supreme-court-to.html
PARAGUAY, Paraguay: US intelligence behind the return of Stroessner's mafia Tiwy.com - June 26, 2012 - The Paraguay Coup: Carefully ... Paraguay 'coup': Outside job? — RT ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF HAITI Why U.N./U.S. occupation of Haiti must end Punishing the Population: The American Occupations of Haiti and ... U.S. occupation Haiti | Black Agenda Report , THE ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF LAST ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA,SEE... OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBER AND NICARAGUAN EX MILITARY COMMANDER EXPOSES US PLOT TO RIG ELLECTIONS,SAYS HE WAS OFFERED MONEY TO PUSH US PROPAGANDA AGAINST ORTEGAS RE ELECTION VICTORY http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/11/opposition-party-member-and-nicaraguan.html http://thenakedfacts.blogspot.com/2011/11/nicaraguan-supreme-court-to.html
NOT TO MENTION SUBVERSIVE PLOTS,CONSPIRACIES IN EL SALVADOR More U.S. Meddling in El Salvador? | Committee in ... - CISPES US Subverting Latin America http://www.tiwy.com/news.phtml?id=209 Stop US intervention in El Salvador! No US Intervention in El Salvador's Internal Affairs THE ATTEMPTED ASSASINATION OF MORALES IN BOLIVIA,
CENSORED NEWS: Wikileaks: CIA role in alleged Evo Morales ... Bolivian president Morales links US embassy to alleged assassination Tiwy.com - November 7, 2011 - US Subverting Latin America THE DESTABILIZATION OF ECUADOR,IN ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW OF CORREA Correa: Opposition, U.S. groups behind last year's coup attempt ... CIA behind failed Ecuador coup? - YouTube Ecuador: A third US sponsored coup d'etat against a member state ...
,AND THE COUP AGAINST CHAVEZ YEARS AGO,WICH THIS EX US AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA WHO WROTE PIECE,TOOKA GOOD PART IN.. Washington's role in 2002 Venezuela Coup « South of the Border - a ... The CIA Was Involved In the Coup Against Venezuela's Chavez ... Bush Administration Tries to Hide Role in Venezuela Coup | Op-Eds ... CIA Documents Show Bush Knew of 2002 Coup in Venezuela AND NOW FOR FOR PATRICK DUDDY THE ZIO-CON BACKROUND... Duddy met with the 2002 coup supporting channel, Globovision Wikileaks Cables Reveal U.S. Embassy Works with Venezuelan ... Patrick Duddy was involved in the attempted coup Why Washington Hates Hugo Chavez THESE ARE JUST MOSTLY RECENT EVENTS,WERE I TO POST A CHRONOLOGY OF US INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA ,I'D BE HERE FOR YEARS CITING VOLUMES...NOW,WHAT WE ACTUALLY WITNESS CFR's DUDDY OUTLINE, IS INDEED A PLAN TO INSTIGATE CHAOS IN VENEZUELA BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS IN VENEZUELA,REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME...COUPLED WITH PROS AND CONS,ON HOW TO PROCEED,SHOULD CHAVEZ BE ASSASSINATED,UNDEMOCRATICALLY SUCCEEDED,OR VIOLENTLY OPPOSED BY GROUPS US WILL BE BACKING...I HOPE VENEZUELANS AND CHAVEZ ARE TAKING NOTICE(TO MY KNOWLEDGE THEY ARE)...
CENSORED NEWS: Wikileaks: CIA role in alleged Evo Morales ... Bolivian president Morales links US embassy to alleged assassination Tiwy.com - November 7, 2011 - US Subverting Latin America THE DESTABILIZATION OF ECUADOR,IN ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW OF CORREA Correa: Opposition, U.S. groups behind last year's coup attempt ... CIA behind failed Ecuador coup? - YouTube Ecuador: A third US sponsored coup d'etat against a member state ...
,AND THE COUP AGAINST CHAVEZ YEARS AGO,WICH THIS EX US AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA WHO WROTE PIECE,TOOKA GOOD PART IN.. Washington's role in 2002 Venezuela Coup « South of the Border - a ... The CIA Was Involved In the Coup Against Venezuela's Chavez ... Bush Administration Tries to Hide Role in Venezuela Coup | Op-Eds ... CIA Documents Show Bush Knew of 2002 Coup in Venezuela AND NOW FOR FOR PATRICK DUDDY THE ZIO-CON BACKROUND... Duddy met with the 2002 coup supporting channel, Globovision Wikileaks Cables Reveal U.S. Embassy Works with Venezuelan ... Patrick Duddy was involved in the attempted coup Why Washington Hates Hugo Chavez THESE ARE JUST MOSTLY RECENT EVENTS,WERE I TO POST A CHRONOLOGY OF US INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA ,I'D BE HERE FOR YEARS CITING VOLUMES...NOW,WHAT WE ACTUALLY WITNESS CFR's DUDDY OUTLINE, IS INDEED A PLAN TO INSTIGATE CHAOS IN VENEZUELA BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS IN VENEZUELA,REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME...COUPLED WITH PROS AND CONS,ON HOW TO PROCEED,SHOULD CHAVEZ BE ASSASSINATED,UNDEMOCRATICALLY SUCCEEDED,OR VIOLENTLY OPPOSED BY GROUPS US WILL BE BACKING...I HOPE VENEZUELANS AND CHAVEZ ARE TAKING NOTICE(TO MY KNOWLEDGE THEY ARE)...
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