On Monday, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on U.S. policy options in Syria. Panelists included Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, director of research for the Saban Center For Middle East Policy; Senior Fellow Michael Doran; Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack; and Fellow Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center who appeared live from Doha Via video feed. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes moderated the discussion.
Tamara Wittes began the discussion expressing the necessity of the event due to the intolerable humanitarian situation continuing to worsen in Syria. The discussion, said Wittes considered risks (both known and unknown) that could result from any policy options. Daniel Byman introduced the memo produced by the Saban Center that weighs the efficacy of six different policy options, with the ultimate goal being regime change in Syria. The six different approaches include all out diplomacy, regime change through coercion, arming the Syrian opposition, the use of air power in addition to aiding the opposition, regime change by U.S. invasion, and a NATO sponsored international military intervention. Byman said that while the paper did not advocate for any specific option, it considers the advantages and disadvantages associated with each policy decision.
Salman Shaikh answered a question from Wittes concerning the efficacy of diplomacy after a year of intense violence. Shaikh began examining the new U.N. and Arab League envoy under former U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan. Shaikh said that Annan is, “acutely aware that he faces a ticking clock, and a rising body count,” that sets a timetable on his diplomatic effort. While Annan has not made the conclusion that diplomatic efforts or over, Shaikh stated that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has expressed Russia’s support of Annan’s mission. Shaikh remained unsure if the mission would result in a Yemeni-style transition or a similar political process. Shaikh said that this style solution “would be the best outcome” and the space for diplomatic solution “grows dimmer by the day.”
Mike Doran presented the six policy options as a trade off between cost and effectiveness. “The more effective, the higher the cost, the less effective, the more tolerable the cost,” said Doran. Doran believed that the policy that is chosen (if any) would be a function of “how bad is the risk of failure” and the price the American people are willing to pay. Doran stated that there was no chance of a diplomatic solution because of the nature of the regime—as the regime to leave asks the family to leave, which inevitably leads to regime change. Doran suggested that supporting the Assad mission “throws a lifeline to Assad” and “prevents us from making hard decisions” while buying Assad time to retake opposition strongholds. He asserted that Iran should be at the epicenter of every policy decision the U.S. makes regarding Syria. Assad remaining in power will be a victory for Iran. Iran announces it has a nuclear weapon after Assad stays in power would be another blow. Doran thus defined the risk as twofold: humanitarian and strategic.
Kenneth Pollack cautioned the audience against thinking analogically with respect to Syria, referring to the tendency of the people to look for a compassion for Syria in the Libyan, Iraqi, Bosnian conflicts. “Syria does not look like any of those places,” said Pollack. He also noted that the paper did not consider a few options, including a naval blockade or a true no-fly zone due to the fact that in isolation they could not force Assad out but rather act in conjunction with other, more complete policies. Pollack discussed the obvious differences between Libyan and what would be Syrian intervention. When it comes to a U.S. invasion of Syria, Pollack said that the U.S. has learned how to operate and has become very good at post-conflict reconstruction due to lessons learned from historical mistakes in Iraq. Any intervention, especially an all out military operation would require the U.S. to reconstruct—a process that would take hundreds of thousands of troops, billions of dollars, and a definite timetable. Pollack suggested that the U.S. would not be able to “sit out” of this conflict. The other regional players, like Turkey, have voiced that they are uninterested in intervention by work or action, and then if the U.S. does not provide the key elements, intervention does not happen.
Tamara Wittes noted that the options are not stand-alone options, but policy could combine the different approaches. Daniel Byman said that the options are escalatory steps—they progress from hands-off to hands on intervention. Byman called for a progression of the ‘Friends of Syria’ group to another contract group, such as the coalition of the willing, in order to be on the same page and “ensure that groups are not working across purposes.” He also stated that “not choosing” an option is still choosing—choosing to do nothing.
The Q&A session took questions both from Doha and Washington. A question from Doha raised the issue of a “covert operation” in Syria. Dan Byman responded saying that mounting pressures in Syria and taking into consideration the regime’s counterintelligence ability, a covert operation may not be the best option. Kenneth Pollack compared a covert operation to the “overt covert” operations to the arming of contras in Nicaragua. “Covert is not a ‘quick fix’,” said Pollack. Mike Doran said that covert operations were not an option because of “slippery slide scenarios” saying that there are concerns that any sort of military operation may escalate into full on military operations. “We are trying to strengthen the insurgency, and our political statements demoralizing the opposition and strengthening the propaganda of the regime.”
Another question arose concerning Syria’s arsenal of WMD’s. Kenneth Pollack was unsure if Assad would use chemical weapons against his own people considered the mixed populations of Alawi and Sunni enclaves. Byman was more concerned about the “scattering of arsenals” and the sale of arms to the highest bidder as was seen in Libya. Salman Shaikh fielded a question concerning the rhetoric used by regional players in framing the conflict. Shaikh stated that Syria is the “fault-line of a regional conflict” and that it is the time for the U.S. to lead in effect. “The Syrian people have the right to defend themselves. They have the right to communicate with each other,” stated Shaikh. Shaikh asserted that a failure of diplomacy at this current juncture will call into question the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and the entire international system. With regards to the regional conflict, Shaikh stated that Saudi Arabia has already begun to fund the opposition, but he is unsure if they are doing it in an organized way. If not done in an organized fashion, there is a risk of the conflict deteriorating further.
The panel was in agreement that building up an insurgency would be a long term option, and also that “dithering” by the international community forces Syrians to choose between dying for their cause or living another day—choosing to live is what the Assad regime is waiting for. Mike Dorancalled for increased pressures and incentives for academic elite in Aleppo to defect. Salman Shaikh noted that tribal leaders have welcomed U.S. involvement and assistance to the Syrian people. He quoted one tribal leader saying that aiding of the opposition would be “opening a new chapter” in the relationship between America and the Arab and Muslim world.
[ED NOTES: AND THERE YOU HAVE IT,CONSPIRING,CONSPIRING,AND ADMITTING TO CONSPIRING ...
No comments:
Post a Comment