ZIONIST ISRAHELLI THINK TANK ISSUES REPORT ON HOW THE ZIONIST,  ILLEGAL NUCLEAR ROGUE STATE CAN OVERCOME ITS OWN FUTURE NPT VIOLATIONS..WHILE DEMANDING OTHERS MUST OBEY...A NUCLEAR TURKEY IS OK,SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL... 
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee 
Center for Strategic Studies http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=58185  Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, Editors Memorandum
#1 Nuclear Nonproliferation, Customary International Law, and the 
Ramifications for Israel
Owen Alterman...Looking Ahead ...Israel has an interest in the success of the nonproliferation regime(ED NOTES:M.E. NATIONS AGAINST ISRAHELLS NUKES), especially among its Middle Eastern neighbors. At the same time, the fulfillment of that policy objective – compliance with nonproliferation norms – increases the likelihood of the NPT’s one day becoming non-derogable customary law. That customary law, binding on Israel, could serve to limit Israel’s policy options. Should nonproliferation become customary law, Israel’s policy option of possession of nuclear weapons would become legally unavailable. Israel’s option of possessing nuclear weapons could become a victim of the nonproliferation regime’s success...a future argument that the nonproliferation regime has become binding customary law is not without risks for Israel. It could provide further rhetorical ammunition to Israel’s foes.(ED NOTES:RETHORICAL?YOU HAVE AN ILLEGAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE,AND WHEN CALLED OUT ON IT,THEY CALL IT RETHORICAL AMMUNITION?) It could become a further claim of violation of international law and constitute a basis (or pretense) to maintain grievances against Israel even once regional peace agreements were signed.This is not to say that Israel should change its policy and encourage the nonproliferation regime’s failure and consequent nuclearization of the Middle East. Rather, the issue of customary law provides a reminder that even that policy has its risks. At present, these remain potential risks only. Should the nonproliferation regime succeed, however, Israel will need to present an aggressive and persistent argument that no customary rule exists or, failing that, argue that the NPT’s terms do not apply to Israel by virtue of its persistent objection.(ED NOTES:IN OTHER WORDS,SHOULD ISRAHELL,BE CALLED TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO SAME STANDARDS OR LAWFUL PARAMETERS ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS,AND TREATIES AS IT DEMANDS OF OTHERS IN REGION,ISRAHELL SHOULD CLAIM IT DOESNT HAVE TO ADHERE TO THEM WHILE OTHERS DO, IT SHOULD CONTINUE ITS CHILDISH TEMPER TANTRUMS AND RESISTANCE TO ANY SUCH OBLIGATIONS.DEMONSTRATE IT NEVER HAS NOR WILL IT CONFORM, TO INTERNATIONAL LAWS,WHILE SCREAMING OTHERS MUST.)   38 Israel will need to mobilize international support for that position and for the position that nonproliferation will not have become a peremptory norm. At the same time, policymakers must recognize that this need to request additional diplomatic help would grant further leverage to Israel’s allies, who could demand concessions on other matters in exchange for enhanced diplomatic and legal support on nuclear issues. As such, a binding customary nonproliferation regime could impair Israel’s overall strategic position and narrow its policy options. Israel understands that a Saudi nuclear program would primarily be intended as a balance against Iran. Furthermore, in recent years there have been many reports about security and intelligence cooperation between a number of Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Nonetheless, one cannot guarantee that nuclear installations and know-how in Saudi possession could at some point in the future be pointed at Israel and/or fall into the hands of terrorists.#6 Towards Turkey’s Own Bomb? Not Yet

Gallia Lindenstrauss...Conclusion An assessment of whether Turkey is expected to decide to develop a military nuclear capability in the foreseeable future indicates that the chances are limited. As long as Iran maintains ambiguity, Turkey can apparently continue to deny that there is a problem. Even if Iran adopts an open nuclear policy, it is expected that NATO’s guarantees to Turkey, or at least those of the United States, will be strengthened. It is possible that this will reduce Turkish fears of the Iranian nuclear threat.At the same time, special attention should be paid to Turkey’s civilian nuclear program, which includes plans to build some twenty nuclear reactors by 2030. In contrast to the past, it appears that this time Turkey’s chances of succeeding in developing this capability are good. Its growing energy needs apparently justify such a program, and today there are political and economic conditions that will make it possible to build this capability. If NATO is not weakened and Turkey remains a NATO member, it is nearly certain that this civilian nuclear capability will not be viewed any more negatively than programs in South Korea or Japan. At the same time, a civilian program has the potential to become a military program, and the West, primarily the United States, must identify and contend with Turkey’s security needs so that Turkey will not join the race toward military nuclearization in the Middle East.

[ED NOTES:TRANSLATION,ISRAHELL DEEMS TURKEYS NUCLEAR PROGRAM,JUSTIFIABLE,EVEN SAUDI ARABIAS...